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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should this Court continue the firm tradition 
of Utah common law that neither a husband or a wife has a 
derivative cause of action for loss of spousal consortium 
against a negligent party who has caused injury to the other 
spouse? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations, or other measures whose 
interpretation is determinative of the issue presented for 
review, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case. The Appellant, Sherrie Hackford 
("Wife") sought her own damages for losses consortium of her 
husband, the plaintiff, Greg Hackford ("Husband"), because of 
injuries he allegedly sustained in an electrical contact 
accident in Naples, Uintah County, Utah involving an electrical 
distribution line of the respondent Utah Power & Light Company 
("Utah Power") while performing roofing services on behalf of 
the respondent Western Petroleum, Inc. ("Western Petroleum"). 
Before filing an answer, Utah Power filed a Rule 12(b) (6) 
motion to dismiss the claims of Sherrie Hackford. The court 
granted that motion based upon this Court's decision in the 
case of Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972) 
and other Utah authorities. 
Statement of Facts, The facts of this case are 
still undeveloped; however, there are enough to show the type 
of case the plaintiff, Sherrie Hackford claims it to be. 
1. The Husband and Wife both assert that Utah Power 
and Light and Western Petroleum were negligent with respect to 
the cause of significant painful, disabling and incapacitating 
injuries to the Husband which occurred in Naples, Utah. (R. 3, 
4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, <U 5, 11, 13, 16, 17 and 18). 
2. Also, the Husband seeks damages for medical 
expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity, and general 
damages for pain and suffering (R. 7 and 9, 1M( 14 and 18, 
Claims I and II). 
3. In addition to these, the Wife, as a derivative 
of the plaintiff's claims, claims to have lost the cooperation, 
services, society, advice, counsel, companionship and conjugal 
affection that her Husband would otherwise have been able to 
provide because of the allegedly severe and permanent nature of 
her Husband's injuries (R. 9, K 21, Claim III). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The respondent Western Petroleum hereby adopts the 
summary of arguments and the arguments as set forth in the 
brief of respondent Utah Power. However, Western Petroleum 
wishes to expand on those arguments as follows: 
It is beyond dispute that Utah has never 
recognized the cause of action for loss of consortium. 
Consequently, the arguments of appellant, Sherrie Hackford, 
that consortium claims remain an integral part of the common 
law have no validity with regard to this particular case. 
The Utah Married Women's Act, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4, 
(1953 as amended) should be construed so as to satisfy the 
legislative objective of placing a husband and wife on equal 
footing. This Court has consistently held that this should be 
done by taking away from the husband his derivative cause of 
action for injuries sustained by his wife, rather than giving 
to the wife a parallel derivative cause of action for injuries 
sustained by the husband. 
Finally, the wife's argument that Article 1, §11 and 
Article 1 §7 of the Utah Constitution prohibit the legislature 
from abolishing any common-law litigation right without the 
provision of a reasonable alternative has no validity. This 
is so because Utah has never recognized the cause of action for 
loss of consortium. Consequently, Article 1, §11 and Article 
1, § 7 have no application to the case at hand. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. 
Only that part of English common law which was not in 
conflict with the laws of Utah and that was consistent with the 
needs of the people, was adopted under Utah Code Ann. §68-3-1; 
at the same time, Utah's Legislature adopted the Married 
Women's Act, which gave a wife the power to sue in her own 
name, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4. Read together, these two 
sections of Utah Code Ann, have been held to deny a cause of 
action for loss of consortium of either a wife or a husband. 
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 95 (1972); Madison 
v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Tjas 
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979). 
Neither does Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Con-
stitution establish a right to recover for loss of consortium. 
The Utah court interpreted this section several decades ago in 
Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915): 
The courts have, however, always considered 
and treated those provisions, not as 
creating new rights, or as giving new re-
medies where none otherwise are given, but 
as placing a limitation upon the Legis-
lature to prevent that branch of the state 
government from closing the doors of the 
courts against any person who has a legal 
right which is enforceable in accordance 
with some known remedy. Where no right of 
action is given, however, or no remedy 
exists, under either the common law or some 
statute, those constitutional provisions 
create none. . . . 
The right and power, as well as the duty, 
of creating rights and to provide remedies, 
lies with the Legislature, and not with the 
courts. Courts can only protect and 
enforce existing rights, and they may do 
that only in accordance with established 
and known remedies. 
151 P. at 366-67. 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-2-4, SHOULD BE LIBERALLY 
CONSTRUED TO EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE 
OF PLACING A HUSBAND AND WIFE ON EQUAL FOOTING. 
Utah's Married Women's Act is a specific derogation 
of the common law of England. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 
591 (Utah 1980). While Stoker focuses on the doctrine of in-
terspousal tort immunity, it is an important case for the 
respondent's purposes in that it interprets Utah's Married 
Women's Act in conjunction with Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. In validating the Utah Married Women's Act, 
the Utah court relied upon Utah Code Ann,, §68-3-2, which 
reads: 
The rule of common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly con-
strued has no application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish the 
laws of the state respecting the subjects 
to which they relate and their provisions 
and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. Whenever there is any variance 
between the rules of equity and the rules 
of common law in reference to the same 
matter, the rules of equity shall prevail. 
This rule of liberal construction of statutes, to 
effectuate the objectives of the legislature, has been consis-
tently followed by the Utah Supreme Court. As recently as 
early 1983, the Court has stated: 
It is also a well-established rule of 
statutory construction that statutes and 
ordinances "are endowed with a strong pre-
sumption of validity; and that they should 
not be declared unconstitutional if there 
is any reasonable basis upon which they can 
be found to come within the constitutional 
frame work (sic) ..." 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983), citing 
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974) (citations omitted). 
Earlier, the Utah court looked at the constitutionality of the 
Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Utah Code Ann., §31-40-1, 
et seg. (1971). In two other jurisdictions having similar 
constitutional provisions, the courts had reached opposite 
conclusions as to the constitutionality of those sections. In 
light of that split of decisions, the Utah court stated: 
This court makes every reasonable 
presumption in favor of constitutionality 
and will not nullify a legislative 
enactment unless it is clearly and 
expressly prohibited by the constitution. 
In seeking the correct application of 
statutes and consitutional provisions, 
this court looks to the circumstances, 
which brought them into being, and the 
purposes sought to be accomplished. 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guaranty Assn., 564 P.2d 
751, 753-54 (Utah 1977) (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme 
Court has also stated that if there is any question as to the 
interpretation or effect to be given a statute, or as to the 
preference to be given statutes of similar import, it is 
appropriate to look to the circumstances of their origin and 
their purposef and also to what has been done in acceptance and 
practice as to those statutes. Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 
1207, 1208-09 (Utah 1980). Recent decisions handed down by the 
Utah Supreme Court following the liberal rule of construction 
include Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 
(1983); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (1982); Christensen 
v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (1982); Parson Asphalt 
Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 
(1980); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (1980); 
Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (1978). 
Utah Code Ann., §30-2-4 has repeatedly been inter-
preted by this Court as to deny a spouse a cause of action for 
loss of consortium. The act did not give a wife a cause of 
action for negligent or intentional injuries caused to her 
husband. Rather, it took the action that a husband could main-
tain for injuries caused to his wife and gave it to the wife. 
Redress for loss of services to a family as a result of in-
juries were properly part of the primary injured person's claim 
only. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979); Ellis v. 
Hathaway, 493 P.2d 985 (Utah 1972). For instance, where a wife 
is injured and the husband seeks to recover for loss of con-
sortium, the wife, if anybody, should recover the expenses 
incurred in connection with her injuries. The reasonable value 
of the services which she was able to perform as a result of 
her injuries and which she otherwise would have performed would 
be part of her recovery, if any, she is entitled to. Corbridge 
v. Morrin & Sons, 432 P.2d 41, 42 (Utah 1967). See also, Black 
v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 470 (D. Utah 1967). 
Therefore, under the liberal construction rule of 
statutory interpretation, the Married Women's Act, as it has 
been held consistently by the Utah Supreme Court, should be 
interpreted as taking away from a husband his derivative cause 
of action for injuries sustained by his wife, rather than 
giving to the wife a parallel derivative cause of action for 
injuries sustained by the husband. 
POINT III 
NO DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT APPLIES. 
The main thrust of appellant's due process argument 
is that the "injury redress" provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 11, along with the due process 
clause, Article I, Section 7, prohibits the legislature from 
abolishing any common-law litigation right without the provi-
sion of a reasonable alternative. The response to this argument 
centers upon the first point raised earlier: Utah has never 
recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium. When Utah 
adopted the common law of England, it did so only to the extent 
that the common law did not come in conflict with the express 
statutory provisions of the Utah Code Ann, Also, as stated 
earlier, the Married Women's Act was adopted concurrently with 
the common law of England. Thus, the common-law action for 
loss of consortium in the husband was never adopted by Utah. 
Due process of law is not denied the appellant because no 
common-law right was abolished upon the passage of the Married 
Women's Act. No such right ever existed under Utah law, there-
fore, the legislature could not have abolished it. 
Likewise, the main thrust of appellant's equal 
protection argument is that Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution requires that the Utah Court recognize the cause 
of action for loss of consortium because an injury has been 
sustained by the spouse. The Wife contends Utah's failure to 
allow recovery for loss of consortium is thus a denial of 
redress for an injury sustained. She compares the loss of 
consortium suit to suits for wrongful death and alienation of 
affections, where Utah recognizes some of the elements of 
consortium in determining whether or not a party is liable for 
injury to such consortium rights. 
Western Petroleum's response to this argument is 
three-fold. First, Article I, Section 11, does not create a new 
right in a spouse. Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 367 (Utah 
1915). This provision is limited in its scope to guaranteeing 
the continued rights of action recognized under the law of the 
jurisdiction, and preventing the legislature from curtailing 
those recognized-rights. Article I, Section 11 provides for a 
continued enjoyment of certain enumerated rights, rather than a 
creation of new substantive rights. 
Second, appellant is not denied redress for any in-
juries suffered because recovery is accomplished in the primary 
suit brought by the injured party. Under Utah law, recovery 
for loss of services to a spouse is properly part of the ori-
ginal cause of action brought by the injured party. Morrin, 
Tjas, Ellis, supra. These cases recognize the intertwined 
nature of the primary injury and the loss of consortium. The 
court of appeals of Maryland, in denying a wife a separate 
cause of action for loss of consortium, stated: 
It is because these marital interests are 
in reality so interdependent, because 
injury to these interests is so essentially 
incapable of separate evaluation as to the 
husband and wife, that the conception of 
the joint action seems to us a fair and 
practical judicial development. 
Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967). 
In Deems, the court required the wife to be joined as a party 
in the original suit brought by the husband in order for her to 
recover. Failure to be joined in such action, precluded the 
wife from bringing any subsequent action. Of the equal pro-
tection cases cited by appellant, beginning with Hitaffer v. 
Argonne Co., Inc. , 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. App. 1950), and continu-
ing with Olin v. Illinois Banking Corp., 260 F.Supp. 820 (D.C. 
Mich. 1966), Karczuwski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.Co., 274 
F.Supp. 169 (D.C. 111. 1967), Leffler v. Wiley, 239 N.E.2d 235 
(Ohio 1968) , and Witney v. Fisher , 417 A.2d 934 (Vermont 1980) , 
the right to sue for loss of consortium was extended to a wife 
basically because such right was already recognized in a 
husband. Denial of the right to sue for loss of consortium was 
considered an unreasonable abridgment of a justiciable right to 
obtain redress for injuries caused by wrongful acts of another. 
A wife's right to recover for injuries suffered was considered 
as cut off completely. Utah, however, cuts off the action for 
loss of consortium in both the husband and wife because re-
covery is considered as already accomplished in a suit by the 
primarily-injured party. 
Finally, the derivative nature of the loss of con-
sortium suit is distinguishable from other actions which 
recognize consortium rights. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution incorporates the same basic general fundamental 
principles as are incorporated in the equal protection clause 
of the Federal Constitution. Under the Utah provision, whether 
a statute meets equal protection standards depends in the first 
instance upon the objectives of the statute and upon whether 
the classifications established provide a reasonable basis for 
promoting those objectives. The classification must rest upon 
some difference, which bears a reasonable and just relation to 
the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and 
can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. In 
the immediate instance, the objective of the statute in 
question was to place husbands and wives on equal footing in 
pursuing their respective litigation rights. The classifi-
cation here would be those spouses suing for loss of con-
sortiumf as compared to spouses suing for wrongful death or 
alienation of affection. Such classification is reasonable 
because the action for loss of consortium is a derivative suit; 
whereas, the actions for wrongful death and alienation of 
affections are primary suits in and of themselves. The in-
dividual who is wrongfully deprived of life cannot bring his or 
her own suit. However, a surviving spouse can bring an action 
for wrongful death. Recovery of compensatory damages in a 
wrongful death action is designed to compensate the spouse and 
heirs of the deceased, rather than to compensate the deceased. 
Behrans v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1185 
(Utah 1983). In a suit for alienation of affections, the suing 
spouse has suffered an alleged injury; however, the other 
spouse has no injury. In comparison, the spouse suing for loss 
of consortium must prove a tort by the defendant committed 
against the primarily-injured spouse. Recovery is derivative 
and contingent upon the primary suit. Thus, the test under 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution is met: The 
object of the Married Women's Act is reasonable, and the 
classification established by the act is reasonable and bears a 
just and reasonable relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed. See Malan v. Lewis, No. 17606 
(Utah May 1, 1984) . 
CONCLUSION 
Western Petroleum respectfully requests that the 
order of Judge Conder be affirmed on the basis that Utah does 
not recognize such a derivative cause of action on behalf of 
the spouse of an injured plaintiff. // /) 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
APPENDIX B 
Utah Constitutionf Article I, Section 11 
All courts shall be open, and every personf for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
APPENDIX C 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 
All laws of a general nature have uniform operation, 
